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ABSTRACT: An empirical analysis of various waves of the ALLBUS social survey 
shows that the level and the structure of unionization has become more and more 
similar in eastern and western Germany in the period 1992 to 2000. The originally 
high level of union density in eastern Germany has dropped below that of western 
Germany, and union membership has been falling steadily in both parts of the 
country since 1992. Repeated cross-sectional analyses indicate that the factors 
influencing individuals’ probability of union membership have converged over time 
between western and eastern Germany. After an assimilation period of about ten 
years the same set of variables can be used to explain unionization in post-
socialist eastern Germany and in traditionally capitalist western Germany. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Eine empirische Analyse mehrerer Wellen der ALLBUS-
Befragung zeigt, dass sich Ausmaß und Struktur der gewerkschaftlichen Mitglied-
schaft in Ost- und Westdeutschland von 1992 bis 2000 zunehmend angeglichen 
haben. Der ursprünglich hohe Organisationsgrad in den neuen Ländern ist unter 
das Niveau in den alten gefallen, und die Mitgliederzahlen gehen in beiden Lan-
desteilen seit 1992 zurück. Wiederholte Querschnittsanalysen deuten darauf hin, 
dass die Einflussfaktoren der Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Mitgliedschaft im Zeitver-
lauf zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland konvergiert sind. Nach einer Annähe-
rungsperiode von rund zehn Jahren können jetzt die selben Variablen verwendet 
werden, um die gewerkschaftliche Organisierung im post-sozialistischen 
Ostdeutschland und im traditionell kapitalistischen Westdeutschland zu erklären. 
 
KEYWORDS: Union membership, union density, Germany 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since October 3, 1990, West and East Germany are united, after having been 
politically separated for more than forty years by the iron curtain. In these four 
decades, not only the political and economic system was different – the social 
environment, living conditions, wealth, consumer behaviour and even the 
language developed differently. Unification meant the end of the (hugely 
inefficient) socialist “command economy” of East Germany and a transition into the 
kind of social market economy long established in West Germany. The main 
elements of the West German economic and legal framework, including private 
property rights, free price formation, a free enterprise system and the entire 
industrial relations system, were extended to eastern Germany.
1 The rapid 
economic and monetary union (starting already on July 1, 1990) was shock 
therapy for East Germany, and the transition process – though supported by 
massive financial transfers from the West – has been painful and not fully 
successful (for details see, e.g., Sinn and Sinn 1992, Welfens 1996 and 
Heilemann and Rappen 2000). 
 
German unification proved to be a major (and largely unexpected) challenge not 
only for politicians and economists, but also for the trade unions. The extension of 
the West German institutional framework of industrial relations to eastern 
Germany enabled the western unions – plagued by falling membership and 
density – to expand into the east. Since they were able to take over the members 
of the former state trade union, membership initially grew far beyond expectations, 
with the western unions signing up more than 4 million new members in the east. 
However, it proved very difficult to keep the new members, and union membership 
has been falling drastically since 1991 (see Fichter 1997 and Müller-Jentsch and 
Ittermann 2000). These membership problems are often attributed to the 
widespread deindustrialization and the huge employment losses in the transition 
process in eastern Germany, but insufficient union activity at the workplace, a 
disregard of the different history, socialisation and socioeconomic characteristics 
of the members in eastern Germany as well as membership identification 
problems may also play a role. Moreover, union membership losses are not 
restricted to eastern Germany and its special problems of transition but have been 
on the rise in western Germany, too (cf. Fichter 1997, 1998). 
                                            
1 Following common terminology, this paper uses the expressions West Germany and East 
Germany when referring to the two German states before unification, whereas western and 
eastern Germany refer to the two regions (and labour markets) of united Germany.  4 
 
While a number of studies have documented and tried to explain the development 
of union membership and participation in eastern (and western) Germany (see, 
e.g., Frege 1996, Fichter 1997, 1998 and Ebbinghaus 2002), to the best of our 
knowledge there has been no attempt to investigate econometrically the 
determinants of union membership in both parts of Germany. Since it may be 
interesting to see whether the factors influencing union membership are different 
in eastern and western Germany and whether these factors (and union density) 
converge or diverge over time, this paper employs individual-level survey data to 
study these issues. Drawing on the large ALLBUS surveys of employees for the 
period 1992 to 2000, we analyse the extent and the determinants of union 
membership in western and eastern Germany, and we find a tendency of 
convergence between employees in both parts of Germany. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses union membership 
trends and organization problems since German unification, supplementing union 
statistics by representative survey data. A brief overview over theoretical 
explanations of union membership decisions is provided in section  3. Section  4 
presents the results of our econometric investigation and identifies the main 
determinants of union membership in eastern and western Germany; section  5 
concludes. 
 
2. UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 
In the last decades trade unions in many countries have experienced severe 
membership losses and reductions in union density (see Ebbinghaus and Visser, 
2000, Visser 2003). Germany is no exception to this trend. In the 1980s, 
membership stagnated around 7.8 million for unions belonging to the German 
Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and around 9.5 
million for all unions (i.e. including the members of the competing union 
federations DAG, DBB and CGB). Union density, defined as the ratio of union 
members over employees, even fell in the 1980s in West Germany (see Müller-
Jentsch and Ittermann 2000, Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). For the unions, 
therefore, German unification created a new and unexpected chance (as well as a 
great challenge) for organizational development. 
 
In the course of the full-scale transfer of the West German institutional framework 
to the east, the DGB unions decided to expand to eastern Germany by applying a  5 
takeover model in which the East German state-controlled labour organization, the 
Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB), was to voluntarily dissolve itself 
and recommend its members to transfer their enrollment to the appropriate branch 
union of the DGB.
2 Following this strategy, the DGB unions managed to sign up 
more than 4.1 million members in eastern Germany in 1990 and 1991, which was 
almost one-half of all former FDGB members (see the data in Dorsch 1996 and 
Fichter 1998). However, due to the special modalities of membership recruitment, 
not all of the new members were highly motivated to join,
3 and the membership 
boom directly after unification was a very special case which “did not follow any 
‘normal’ patterns of union organizational development” (Fichter 1997: 87). Soon 
the trend reversed, with the DGB unions losing almost 800,000 members in 1992 
and another 500,000 members in 1993, and membership in eastern Germany has 
continued to fall since. By the end of 1998, the last year for which disaggregate 
union statistics are available, the DGB unions had only 1.8 million members in 
eastern Germany, a loss of 56 per cent since 1991. Membership problems were 
aggravated by the fact that in the same period almost 1.2 million members turned 
their back on the DGB unions in western Germany (see Müller-Jentsch and 
Ittermann 2000). 
 
The analysis of declining union membership and density is rendered difficult by the 
fact that only the DGB unions used to provide separate membership figures for 
eastern and western Germany, whereas the other unions have only presented 
figures for Germany as a whole. Moreover, official member statistics of all unions 
are inflated by a large (but not precisely known) number of retired members, 
preventing the calculation of meaningful union density figures. In order to 
circumvent these problems, representative survey data of employees in both parts 
of Germany can be used. 
 
The data used in this study are taken from various waves of the ALLBUS, the 
German general social survey. This survey has been conducted in West Germany 
every second year since 1980, and for a nominal fee the data are available for 
scientific research. Note that the ALLBUS data sets are not part of a panel study; 
for each wave an independent random sample is drawn covering people aged 18 
                                            
2 For details and various phases of this process, see Artus (1996) and Fichter (1997). The 
alternative of union merger was regarded as unacceptable since the FDGB was synonymous to 
authoritarian socialist rule and thus would have been a political liability of the first order. 
3 This is stated quite clearly by Fichter (1997: 86): “In principle, all West German unions adhered to 
the rule of individual enrolment. But in practice, it was often disregarded. … Indeed, not a few 
East Germans became members of a DGB union without really knowing it and without having 
time to make a conscious decision for or against.”  6 
years or more. An additional baseline survey was conducted in 1991 shortly after 
German unification, and since then the samples include residents in the new 
federal states in eastern Germany (as well as German-speaking foreigners).
4 In 
our study the sample is reduced to Germans because foreigners form a small and 
rather heterogeneous proportion of the samples. We look at individuals who were 
18 to 64 years old and who were working full time or part time, either as blue collar 
workers, white collar workers (except top managers) or civil servants (Beamte). 
 
 
Table  1:  Percentage of union members among German employees,   
1992-2000* 
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* Source: Own calculations based on the ALLBUS data for 1992-2000. Numbers in 
brackets are the lower/upper bounds of the binomial exact 95% confidence 
interval. 
 
                                            
4 For additional information on the ALLBUS, see Terwey (2000). In order to facilitate replications 
and extensions, the STATA do-files used in this study are available from the second author on 
request.  7 
Table 1 presents (in intervals of four years) information on union density available 
from our sample since 1992 for western and eastern Germany. In contrast to usual 
calculations of density rates that rely on union figures and therefore include both 
active and retired members in the numerator (see e.g. Müller-Jentsch and 
Ittermann 2000), our ALLBUS data refer to employees only and enable us to 
calculate a more realistic net density rate defined as the percentage of union 
members among western and eastern German employees. Table  1 shows that 
only one of four western and less than one of five eastern German employees is 
still a member of a trade union. Although the 95 per cent confidence intervals are 
quite large, it is obvious that union density figures have fallen in the observation 
period, in particular in eastern Germany. There density reached almost 40 per cent 
in 1992, clearly above the western level of 29 per cent. By 2000, however, the 
picture was reversed: density in eastern Germany had fallen to 18.5 per cent, 
which is even lower than the western German density of 25 per cent. 
 
By and large, such a negative trend can be observed for men and women and for 
different groups of employees. In eastern and western Germany union density is 
lowest for white collar workers and highest for civil servants. In 2000, density was 
also lower for women than for men in both parts of Germany. Interestingly, in 1992 
this had not been the case in eastern Germany. This may be interpreted as an 
indication that not only the level but also the pattern of unionization has converged 
between eastern and western Germany. 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for the drastic fall in union 
membership and density since 1992,
5 most of which refer to macroeconomic 
factors, to structural change and to the transition process in post-communist 
eastern Germany. The economic shock and the sudden exposure to world-market 
competition which unification meant for the hugely inefficient East German 
economy as well as unions’ strive for rapid wage convergence to western 
standards both resulted in substantial employment losses followed by union 
membership losses. While this is part of the story, the union density figures in 
Table  1 indicate that the unions also lost members among those who are 
employed. Structural change such as the widespread deindustrialization (in 
particular in eastern Germany) and the expansion of the service sector (in both 
parts) as well as the breaking up of the huge combines in eastern Germany have 
also contributed to union membership problems since recruiting has proved more 
difficult in smaller workplaces and in a service-oriented economy.  
                                            
5 More detailed discussions can be found in Fichter (1997) and Ebbinghaus (2002).  8 
 
In addition, however, the role of union policies and of employees’ individual 
characteristics should be taken into account when explaining unionization. In both 
parts of Germany, unions have not been very successful in establishing effective 
workplace organization outside of large industrial plants, and in the course of the 
increasing individualization of society traditional union slogans and collective 
policies are less and less able to attract core groups such as young and white 
collar employees. In eastern Germany many members left the unions in deep 
frustration because they had taken union demands for rapid wage convergence to 
be promises and because they did not feel well represented and integrated by the 
new unions from western Germany. 
 
A similar line of reasoning can be found in Fichter (1997, 1998) who also argues 
that the (western) union leaders disregarded the special socioeconomic 
characteristics of eastern Germany and the different social experiences of its 
employees, and that union attempts to integrate the new members into the new 
structures have been plagued by misunderstandings and disinterest. Somehow in 
contrast, in a survey of the textile industry Frege (1996: 404) finds that the 
willingness to participate seems no lower among eastern German members than 
among their western German counterparts, raising the question “as to whether 
union members’ participation patterns in post-socialist societies are in fact 
significantly different from those in the West …”. 
 
In this context it should be interesting to know which role individual, occupational 
and political characteristics of employees play in explaining union membership. A 
crucial question is whether the unionization decision is affected by the same 
determinants in western and eastern Germany and whether the influence of these 
determinants has converged over time. Before such an empirical analysis will be 
undertaken in section  4, a brief survey of theoretical explanations of union 
membership seems in order. 
 
3. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Traditionally, labour economists have analysed the forces that influence union 
membership within a conventional framework of demand and supply.
6 Union 
membership is considered as though it were an asset in the portfolio of an utility-
                                            
6 This sort of analysis, which can be traced back to Berkowitz (1954) and Pencavel (1971), is 
described in more detail by Hirsch and Addison (1986, ch. 2.5) and Schnabel (2003).  9 
maximizing worker that provides a flow of services, which are private and/or 
collective goods. Demand for union membership depends negatively on its costs 
relative to the price of other goods and assets, whereas wealth or permanent 
income should influence union membership positively if union services are a 
normal good. The larger the benefits of union representation (often proxied by 
personal and industry characteristics), the more likely are employees to join a 
union. Benefits can be wage gains but also net non-pecuniary benefits from a 
unionised work environment such as better working conditions and employment 
security. In contrast, the lower the cost of substitute services (such as social 
welfare benefits), the lower demand for union services should be. Finally, 
individuals’ taste for unionism can affect the demand for union membership. This 
variable is meant to reflect workers‘ attitudes and preferences, ideological motives, 
social pressure and custom, and related non-economic variables stressed by other 
disciplines of social science. 
 
Although unions may not be typical profit maximizers, they face a binding budget 
constraint in that they must fund union organizing, services and the like, which 
means that they must pay attention to revenues and (opportunity) costs. Therefore 
the supply of union services depends positively on revenues whereas the costs of 
union organizing and the costs of servicing existing members both affect supply 
negatively. Organizing and servicing costs are likely to have a fixed-cost 
component so that collective bargaining exhibits decreasing unit costs with respect 
to membership, and unionism is therefore less likely in small firms. Both the costs 
of organizing and of servicing will be affected by employers‘ attitudes toward 
unions and collective bargaining, and they can be influenced substantially by the 
legal structure within which unions may operate. Furthermore union goals (such as 
maximizing membership or a certain utility function) may affect the supply of union 
services in various ways. 
 
Empirical studies generally estimate some variant of a reduced-form equation 
combining the supply and demand functions. Since most of the variables sketched 
above cannot be measured directly, they are often substituted for by proxy 
variables (such as firm size and personal characteristics). However, these 
variables are likely to affect unionism through more than one channel, so that 
interpretation is difficult. In addition to measurement problems in the explanatory 
variables of the reduced-form equation, the amount of union services is also not 
directly observed. Assuming that the level of services is proportional to the level of 
unionization, direct measures of union membership, union density or bargaining 
coverage can be used to proxy union services.  10 
 
However, this sort of cost-benefit analysis of union membership determination 
does not pay enough attention to an important problem unions face in most 
countries, namely the free-rider problem. Many of the services unions provide – 
such as higher wages and better working conditions – accrue both to union 
members and non-members in the workplace. These services can be seen as 
public or collective goods since they are nonrival in consumption and low-cost 
exclusion of non-members is not possible. Hence an individual has a free-rider 
incentive not to join the union. The key problem for economists is to explain why 
any individual would join a union when dues are costly and when the benefits 
apply to all workers regardless of their union status.
7 
 
A prominent explanation of why large groups providing collective goods such as 
trade unions manage to exist despite the free-rider problem stems from Olson 
(1965) who argued that a large group can only have formed for two reasons: 
Either because membership is compulsory or because the group offers selective 
incentives in the form of private goods and services available only to its members 
(with ancillary provision of the collective good as a “byproduct“). As regards 
unions, Olson (1965: 75) thought that “[i]n most cases it is compulsory 
membership and coercive picket lines that are the source of the union’s 
membership“. In many countries, however, “closed shops” (in which union 
membership is a condition of employment) are either illegal or are rarely found 
anymore, and the widespread presence of “open shop“ unions (where 
membership is voluntary) suggests that selective incentives such as strike pay and 




In addition to such material selective incentives, Booth (1985) has suggested to 
interpret the incentive private good as being the „reputation“ utility that derives 
from complying with a social custom of union membership. This idea stems from 
Akerlof (1980) and takes up an argument commonly put forward by sociologists 
                                            
7 In a median voter model in which workers have different reservation wages and hence different 
optimal points in the trade-off between an increased wage and a decreased probability of 
employment, Bulkley and Myles (2001) argue that joining a union instead of free-riding may be 
rational if it enables individuals to influence union bargaining goals and thus their own 
employment probability. 
8 Booth and Chatterji (1995) develop a theoretical model of the simultaneous determination of 
union wages and membership which points to the existence of excludable private goods such 
as grievance procedures or influence over manning arrangements as an important factor 
motivating workers to join unions in the absence of coercive closed shop rules. In models by 
Moreton (1998) and by Jones and McKenna (1994) greater job security for union members acts 
as a selective incentive to join the union.  11 
and psychologists, namely that within a community there is a set of rules and 
customs that are obeyed by individuals because of the sanction of a loss of 
reputation if the custom should be disobeyed. In the context of union membership, 
the social custom can be thought of as urging workers not to free-ride. Following 
social custom theory, Booth (1985) and Naylor (1990) have proposed models in 
which it is assumed that workers directly derive utility from the reputation effect of 
belonging to a union, and which show that a union can exist despite the free-rider 
problem if it achieves a minimum critical density. In the social custom approach, 
the decision to join is interdependent and – contrary to the Olson (1965) free-rider 
paradox – workers may be more prepared to join a union if others are joining.
9 
 
Within this framework, Naylor and Cripps (1993) have shown that when workers‘ 
tastes are heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to reputation, stable 
intermediate union density is a possible equilibrium outcome. They provide an 
explanation of voluntary membership of the open shop trade union in which the 
union density level is likely to increase as a result of a reduction in union 
membership costs, an increase in strike pay or an increase in individuals‘ 
sensitivity to the social custom of union membership and the associated solidarity 
effects. Extensions of the social custom model taking into account employer 
behaviour in form of management opposition to union membership have been 
proposed by Naylor and Raaum (1993) and by Corneo (1995). They show that a 
stable long-run equilibrium may exist, in which strong unions persist in spite of 
management opposition. Furthermore, Booth and Chatterji (1993) provide a model 
of union membership and wage determination which predicts that the open shop 
union is viable only after membership has achieved a minimum critical density, 
and wages are at a sufficient level to support this. 
 
One corollary of most of the models discussed above is that in the absence of 
coercion the open shop union’s provision of services may be crucial in obtaining its 
minimum critical level of density. Union density is likely to increase with the quality 
of the services provided, while at the same time the size and density of the union 
may positively affect the provision of services due to economies of scale. If, 
however, union-like services are available elsewhere at lower cost or if the 
provision of certain welfare benefits by government substitutes for the private 
provision by unions (as stressed by Streeck 1981 and Neumann and Rissman 
                                            
9 Naylor (1990) demonstrates the formal equivalence of the Booth (1985) model and the “critical 
mass“ or “tipping“ models developed by Schelling (1978) and discussed by Marwell and Oliver 
(1993); see also the “resource mobilization“ approach by Klandermans (1984).  12 
1984), the attractiveness of union membership will be reduced and unions may 
face serious problems of survival.
10 
 
In addition to pure economic reasoning, social, psychological and political factors 
may also contribute to explaining the level and development of union membership. 
Without the pretention of exhaustiveness, three theoretical and partly overlapping 
approaches to trade union participation can be distinguished within the social 
psychology, namely the frustration-aggression approach, the rational-choice 
approach and the interactionist approach (see Klandermans 1986).
11 
 
The frustration-aggression approach explains union membership as a result of 
individuals‘ frustration, dissatisfaction or alienation in their work situation (and 
membership resignation in terms of frustration with union policies). However, 
dissatisfaction “is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for participation” 
(Klandermans 1986: 199). The rational-choice approach interprets unionization as 
the outcome of a process of weighing the costs and benefits of participation (a 
prominent example is Crouch 1982). Of course, such an approach also underlies 
economic theories of unionization, but economists often pay attention only to 
individual, selective costs and benefits. In contrast, social scientists try to take a 
broader view and point out that the decision to join a union can also be influenced 
by collective, social and ideological motives, which may be difficult to measure. 
The balance of costs and benefits, combined with expectations about the degree 
to which the union will be able to realize these motives, determine the actual 
membership decision. 
 
In the interactionist approach union participation is inextricably bound up with 
group culture, and an individual’s decision to join a union is strongly influenced by 
his social context, i.e. his living and working environment (see also social identity 
theory, e.g. Tajfel 1982). Concerning the living environment, tradition and 
prevailing opinions within someone’s group are important because here general 
beliefs are formed about unions even before the employment relationship is 
entered into. Starting with Booth (1985) this line of reasoning has been 
                                            
10 Interestingly, the major reason for high union density in East Germany had been that the state 
unions provided various welfare functions such as access to a holiday resort; see also Frege 
(1996). 
11 Short overviews of psychological and socio-political theories of union membership and 
participation can also be found in Guest and Dewe (1988) and Frege (1996). Earlier 
contributions from sociologists and political scientists – stressing the importance of factors such 
as class consciousness, values, modes of production, the composition of the workforce, the 
political climate, the role of government incomes policies, and the centralisation and 
cohesiveness of the labour movement – include Streeck (1981) and Beyme (1981).  13 
incorporated into the social custom models of union membership discussed above 
which in some sense blend interactionist and rational-choice explanations. 
Concerning the working environment, the prevailing union density in an individual’s 
establishment or industry and the contact with the union at the workplace may play 
a role. While this is also recognized in some economic explanations, economists 
have tended to concentrate on the demand side of unionism and have paid less 
attention to the supply side, for example the union’s decision to allocate resources 
to the recruitment of new members. 
 
To a certain degree, social scientists provide other explanations or emphasize 
different determinants of unionization than economists. Some of these factors can 
be incorporated in the economist’s supply-demand and cost-benefit framework 
discussed above whereas others are more difficult to operationalize. Empirical 
studies of the determinants of union membership usually take an eclectic 
approach and combine economic as well as socio-political hypotheses and 
explanations. Surveys of the international empirical evidence are provided, inter 
alia, by Chaison and Rose (1991), Wheeler and McClendon (1991), Riley (1997) 
and Schnabel (2003). They show that according to time-series studies business 
cycle factors and structural developments play a significant role in explaining union 
membership trends and that cross-sectional analyses at the level of individuals 
have identified a number of personal, occupational and firm characteristics, 
attitudes and social variables which are associated with the unionization decision. 
While time-series analysis is not feasible in our short period of observation, the 
latter approach will be pursued now. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In Germany, empirical research as to why individuals belong to a union that makes 
use of cross-sectional analyses has focused exclusively on individual-level data of 
union and non-union employees in the former West Germany.
12 Currently there 
exist six cross-sectional studies that either use data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (Lorenz and Wagner 1991, Wagner 1991, Goerke and 
Pannenberg 1998, Fitzenberger et al. 1999), or from representative surveys 
(Windolf and Haas 1989, Schnabel and Wagner 2003), the majority of which 
                                            
12 Also for West Germany, aggregate time-series analyses in the business cycle tradition have 
shown that economic variables such as wage and price inflation, employment growth and 
unemployment influence union membership growth (see Armingeon 1989 and Schnabel 1989). 
In addition, the composition of the labour force plays a significant role, in particular in explaining 
long-run trends in unionization (Carruth and Schnabel 1990).  14 
analyse data from the 1980s and early 1990s. Interestingly, all six studies find 
establishment size to be a significant determinant of unionization, but other 
significant covariates differ widely between (and even within) studies depending on 
the data set and year analysed and on the econometric specification used. 
Therefore it may be worthwhile to take up an econometric investigation that 
analyses a more recent period of observation and that estimates the same 
equation at several points in time for western and eastern German employees. 
This should enable us to find out which variables actually explain an individual’s 
probability of being a union member, whether the determinants of union 
membership differ between eastern and western Germany, and whether they have 
converged over time. 
 
The ALLBUS data described in section 2 allow us to investigate the determinants 
of union membership because they include information on a number of potential 
covariates such as personal and occupational characteristics, attitudes and family 
background. Since the dependent variable in our investigation is a 1/0-dummy 
indicating whether an employee is a union member or not, a probit analysis 
(estimating the probability of union membership) is appropriate. 
 
In many countries union membership has been found to be systematically related 
in cross-sectional studies to a number of personal characteristics such as sex, age 
and education (see the surveys by Riley 1997 and Schnabel 2003). Table  1 
showed that (with the exception of eastern Germany in 1992) in both parts of 
Germany men exhibit a higher union density than women. This stylised fact has 
traditionally been interpreted as a reflection of men’s greater degree of attachment 
to the labour force which would increase the benefits of unionization both from the 
point of view of workers and of unions. A similar reasoning applies to full time 
workers, and therefore dummy variables for sex and full time working are included 
in the analysis. In addition, an age variable is included in the analysis in order to 
test the hypothesis that younger workers are less likely to be union members. 
Such a relationship can be found in union statistics and it is said to reflect a 
different socialisation of young workers resulting in lower identification with unions, 
a related change of values, and difficulties of recruiting young workers which in 
Germany are often trained in small and medium-sized firms where union density is 
lower (see, e.g., Schnabel and Pege 1992). 
 
The ALLBUS survey also contains information on the educational and 
qualificational background of employees which is not found in union statistics. We 
are able to include dummy variables in our analysis that take on the value of 1 if  15 
employees have finished an apprenticeship or are master craftsmen and if they 
have a polytech or university degree. For the former variable we would expect a 
positive influence on unionization since unions have developed and have 
traditionally served as representatives of skilled craftsmen and since recruitment 
costs should be relatively low for this rather homogeneous group (with high 
employment security) that forms the backbone of the German industrial workforce. 
In contrast, a polytech or university degree is assumed to be negatively associated 
with unionism because more educated employees have greater individual 
bargaining power (and thus a lesser need for collective voice) and because 
sometimes they identify more with management than with the labour movement. 
 
The  occupational status of employees is included in the analysis by dummy 
variables for blue collar workers and civil servants which again enable us to test 
whether the relationships showing up in Table  1 also hold in a multivariate 
analysis. Since blue collar workers and civil servants have rather homogeneous 
preferences and working conditions which make them easier to organize they are 
expected to have a higher probability of being union members. 
 
Workplace and firm characteristics have been found to influence unionization in a 
number of studies (reviewed by Riley 1997 and Schnabel 2003). As mentioned 
above, all previous econometric studies for West Germany found a positive and 
statistically significant effect of firm size on the probability of union membership. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to investigate this relationship since no firm size 
variable is available in our data set. We do have information, however, whether 
employees are working in the public sector. Since union recruitment tends to be 
easier and less costly in large, homogeneous organizations with a bureaucratic 
nature and a low turnover rate, unionization is expected to be higher in the public 
sector than in the market sector. In addition, union services may be valued most 
highly in large, bureaucratic organizations where workers are likely to be treated 
impersonally and feel a greater need for representation and protection. In such 
organizations there may also exist higher peer pressure to conform to a social 
custom of union membership (as suggested by Riley 1997). Finally, in the public 
sector there exist substantially more works councils than elsewhere (cf. Addison et 
al. 2002), and since works councils usually are prime actors of union recruitment 
(Streeck 1981: 209ff.), the propensity to join a union should be higher there. 
 
Some studies have also paid attention to the location of a company and have 
found significant effects of urbanization (see, e.g., the studies by Antos et al. 1980 
for the U.S. and Berg and Groot 1992 for the Netherlands). Since our data set  16 
contains information on the size of the village or city where the individuals live (but 
not where they work), we are able to include in our estimations an index of the size 
of the agglomeration (with values increasing from 1 for less than 2,000 inhabitants 
to 7 for 500,000 and more), and we expect a positive relationship with union 
membership. There are two main reasons for this hypothesis: The first relates to 
union recruitment costs that should be lower in large agglomerations (which also 
have an above-average share of large companies). Secondly, large 
agglomerations usually have a longer tradition of unionization, and the employees 
often have experienced a longer and intensive “industrial socialization” which 
makes them more likely to join a union (cf. Müller-Jentsch 1987). 
 
Political  attitudes of individual employees have been found to be significant 
determinants of union membership in many studies (see the surveys by Riley 1997 
and Schnabel 2003). For West Germany, Windolf and Haas (1989), Lorenz and 
Wagner (1991) and Fitzenberger et al. (1999) all found that Social-Democrat 
(SPD) voters have a higher probability of being union members which is not 
surprising given the historically close relationship between the SPD and the labour 
movement. In the ALLBUS data set there is information on the political orientation 
of respondents measured on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 for extreme left to 10 
for extreme right. Since left-wing views should be associated with a higher 
probability of union membership we expect a negative coefficient of this variable in 
our estimations. 
 
Several theories of social psychology as well as social custom models suggest to 
include social variables into individual-level cross-sectional studies of unionization. 
In Germany, the influence of reference groups and key individuals such as parents 
and spouses on the decision maker has been investigated with mixed success by 
Windolf and Haas (1989) and Goerke and Pannenberg (1998). Our data set 
contains information on whether an employee’s father was a blue collar worker 
(when the interviewee was 15 years old), and we expect this dummy variable to 
have a positive influence on the probability of union membership in western 
Germany due to a union-friendly socialization process in the family. In eastern 
Germany, however, this variable may play a less important role since unionization 
was almost complete in East Germany and was thus part of the socialization 
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Table  2:  Results from estimations of union membership functions for 
western Germany
 




1992 1996  2000 Pooled 
data 
















Full time worker  









Completed apprenticeship or master 









Polytech or university 









Blue collar worker 



















Public sector employee 









Size of village/city 










(index from 1= extreme left 









Father: blue collar worker 









1996 (dummy, 1 if 1996)        -0.120 
(-1.67) 
2000 (dummy, 1 if 2000)        -0.176* 
(-2.29) 








Number of observations  746  788  632  2166 
Note: z-values in brackets; *(**) denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent 
(1 per cent) level. 
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Table  3:  Results from estimations of union membership functions for   
eastern Germany
 




1992 1996  2000 Pooled 
data 
















Full time worker 









Completed apprenticeship or master 









Polytech or university 









Blue collar worker 



















Public sector employee 









Size of village/city 










(index from 1= extreme left 









Father: blue collar worker 









1996 (dummy, 1 if 1996)        -0.360** 
(-3.70) 
2000 (dummy, 1 if 2000)        -0.618** 
(-5.97) 








Number of observations  377  393  366  1136 
Note:  z-values in brackets; *(**) denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent  
(1 per cent) level. 
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The results of our estimations for western and eastern Germany, which were run 
separately for the years 1992, 1996 and 2000 as well as for all data pooled, are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Looking first at the pooled estimations 
in the last column of Table 2, it can be seen that in western Germany men, full 
time workers, blue collar workers, civil servants, employees in the public sector 
and those whose father was a blue collar worker are significantly more likely to be 
union members. In contrast, employees with a polytech or university degree are 
less likely to join a union whereas having finished an apprenticeship or being a 
master craftsman does not significantly influence the unionization decision. The 
probability of union membership significantly increases with the age of an 
employee and with the size of the agglomeration he or she lives in. Individuals’ 
political orientation also plays a significant role in that moving to the right of the 
political spectrum is associated with a falling probability of being a union member. 
A closer look reveals, however, that only four of these variables, namely full time 
worker, blue collar worker, civil servant and political orientation, exert a significant 
influence on union membership in all three years investigated. The impact of the 
other variables suggested by the results of the pooled estimations is not robust 
over time and should not be over-interpreted. 
 
For eastern Germany, the picture presented in Table 4 looks different. The results 
of the pooled estimations in the last column indicate that only five of our eleven 
explanatory variables, namely age, blue collar worker, public sector employee, city 
size and political orientation, seem to play a significant role in explaining 
unionization. Moreover, none of these five variables proves to be statistically 
significant in all three years investigated, and the negative and highly significant 
coefficients on the time dummies show that there has been a substantial reduction 
in the propensity to unionize since 1992 that is independent of the other 
covariates. All in all, this suggests that it is much more difficult to identify the 
determinants of union membership in eastern Germany than in the west. 
 
This raises the question whether the unionization decision in post-socialist eastern 
Germany and in traditionally capitalist western Germany can be explained by the 
same (western) theories and models of union membership determination. In an 
empirical study of 440 union members in the eastern German textile industry, 
Frege (1996: 406) got the impression that union members in eastern Germany do 
not behave differently than their western counterparts with regard to their 
willingness to participate in collective activities, and she concluded that “it seems 
possible and fruitful to apply ‘Western’ theories of union participation to a post-
socialist context despite the differences between post-socialist societies and  20 
Western capitalist societies.”
13 However, Frege (1996) analysed the behaviour of 
those who already were union members and not the unionization decision, which 
could differ between eastern and western Germany. 
 
In order to test for differences in the determinants of union membership between 
western and eastern Germany we pooled the data for both parts and estimated the 
above union membership equation for each year. This model was augmented by a 
complete set of interaction terms in which all eleven variables included were 
interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether the employee lived in western 
Germany or not. Then we performed a Wald test of the joint hypothesis that all the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are zero, which would mean that there are no 
differences between western and eastern Germany concerning the determinants 
of union membership. 
 
For 1992 the prob-value of this test was 0.0005, and therefore the null hypothesis 
of no differences could be rejected at an error level of far less than one per cent. 
This result, indicating that in 1992 the determinants of union membership in 
eastern Germany were totally different from those in western Germany, is not 
surprising given the modalities of union membership recruitment in eastern 
Germany directly after unification (see section 2 and Fichter 1997). Repeating this 
test for 1996 gave a prob-value of 0.0243, which means that the null hypothesis of 
no differences could not be rejected anymore at an error level of one per cent, but 
at an error level of five per cent. By 2000, the end of our observation period, the 
picture had changed considerably. Since the prob-value reached 0.2060, the null 
hypothesis that the determinants of union membership are the same in both parts 
of Germany could not be rejected at any conventional level of significance. This 
means that although the significance and relative importance of individual 
variables may differ, the same set of variables is able to explain the probability of 
union membership in both parts of Germany in the year 2000. 
 
These test results from repeated cross-section regressions may be interpreted as 
indications that the determinants of union membership have converged over time 
between western and eastern Germany. In other words, there is some evidence 
that ten years after unification the same theories and models of unionisation can 
be applied to employees in both parts of Germany. 
 
                                            
13 See also Kuruvilla et al. (1990) who successfully applied western theories to union members in 
Japan.  21 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In uniting two economies and societies that had developed differently for more 
than forty years, German unification has proved to be a political and social 
experiment of the first order. While not all has grown together that belongs 
together (as the former German chancellor Willy Brandt proclaimed at the fall of 
the Berlin wall), some tendencies of assimilation and convergence cannot be 
overlooked. Using a representative data set we were able to show that the level 
and the structure of unionization has become more and more similar in eastern 
and western Germany in the period 1992 to 2000. The originally high level of union 
density in eastern Germany has even dropped below that of western Germany, 
and at just 18.5 per cent it may not be far from the (unspecified) minimum level of 
density identified as critical for union survival in recent theories of unionization. 
Moreover, union membership has been falling steadily in both parts of the country 
since 1992, and repeated cross-sectional analyses indicated that the factors 
influencing individuals’ probability of union membership seem to have converged 
over time between western and eastern Germany. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that a number of personal, occupational and 
attitudinal variables such as age, occupational status, and political orientation play 
a role in the unionization process in Germany, although the influence of many 
variables is not robust over time. There is, however, the problem that the 
determinants of unionization had to be analysed by comparing the characteristics 
of union and non-union employees, whereas the process of joining or leaving a 
union could not be investigated due to lack of data.
14 The same is true for the role 
played by union recruitment strategies and works councils, which might be 
promising areas of further research. 
 
Our empirical findings do not enable us to clearly discriminate between alternative 
(but often related) theories from economics, social psychology and industrial 
relations. This reinforces the impression from the wider literature that it has proved 
difficult to build a bridge between the variety of theoretical approaches and the 
empirical literature on the determinants of unionization (see Schnabel 2003). The 
empirical results seem to indicate, however, that after an assimilation period of 
about ten years the same theories and models can be applied to explain 
unionization in post-socialist eastern Germany and traditionally capitalist western 
Germany. 
                                            
14 Rare analyses of this sort can be found in Waddington and Whitston (1997) and Rij and Daalder 
(1997).  22 
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